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First Lady, Last Rights?
Extending Executive Immunity to
the First Lady
By T. NATASHA PATEL*
Introduction
The First Lady,' as the chair of an advisory committee, reserves
the sole right to revise the final set of recommendations before they
reach the President's desk. In so doing, is she immune from liability
resulting from a failure to add or cut a recommendation?
The First Lady has the power to hire and fire employees at will.
When she does so, is she immune from a wrongful termination suit?
Similarly, if the First Lady makes unwelcomed remarks on a diplo-
matic mission to China, is her speech protected?
The answers to these questions depend on whether a qualified
executive immunity from civil damage liability is available to the First
Lady. Recently, the First Lady's role has expanded beyond the tradi-
tional role of playing the White House hostess.2 The First Lady is
actively involved in both domestic and international politics.3 Accord-
ingly, the First Lady should also be afforded legal immunity from lia-
bility based upon official discretionary acts that her job entails.
Throughout the Clinton presidency, many have claimed that Hil-
lary Clinton has redefined the role of the First Lady.4 In fact, the
ambiguity and unaccountability associated with the First Lady's ac-
tions have been the subject of controversy throughout history.5 Be-
* J.D., U.C. Hastings College of the Law, 1998. University of Georgia, Bachelor of
Arts in Political Science and Philosophy, 1995.
1. Throughout this Note, the term "First Lady" will be used to refer to the spouse of
the United States President.
2. See further discussion infra Section II.
3. See further discussion infra Section H.
4. See Howard Fineman and Mark Miller, Hillary's Role, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 15, 1993,
at 20. Authors point out that the President does not run the Clinton administration alone.
"Unlike most past First Ladies, Mrs. Clinton didn't-and doesn't operate by indirection.
She is not a gatekeeper or silent adviser.... [S]he made key decisions."
5. See Carl Wasserman, Note, Firing the First Lady: The Role and Accountability of
the Presidential Spouse, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1215, 1216 (1995).
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ginning with the second First Lady, Abigail Adams, one can trace the
changing role of the First Lady from silent partner to active partici-
pant in the nation's domestic and foreign affairs. The First Lady's
evolution into a Presidential partner has been a gradual one.'
Hillary Clinton's active role in the Clinton administration has
caused critics to question the political unaccountability of the First
Lady. The First Lady plays an active role in the national government,
yet she is not accountable to the voters. Therefore, there is a need by
some critics for a clear definition of her role.7 Indeed, in 1993, an
attempt was made for the first time in United States history to define
the First Lady's role in government."
The modern tasks of the First Lady include advising the Presi-
dent, playing an active role in government and acting as a representa-
tive and goodwill ambassador for the United States around the
world.9 For these reasons, the First Lady needs qualified immunity.
This Note argues that the First Lady's actions are entitled to qual-
ified executive immunity whenever she acts as a representative of the
federal government. The First Lady, however, should not be awarded
blanket immunity for all acts in her official capacity. Only if, and
when, the First Lady takes on a role beyond that of playing the
"White House hostess" should executive branch immunity apply.
Section I discusses the development of executive branch immu-
nity. Section II discusses the role in politics, and otherwise, that the
First Ladies have played throughout history. Section III examines the
holding in Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. v.
Hillary Rodham Clinton,10 which held that the First Lady was a de
facto federal employee or official. The Note observes that as the im-
portance of the First Lady's role in the Executive Branch continues to
expand, her visibility increases. The American Physicians Court rec-
ognized the importance of her role, and concluded that it must grant
her the same immunity as is it did to the President's cabinet members
and advisors because the First Lady's role essentially parallels that of
any other executive branch official.
6. See Tiffanie Darke, All the President's Ladies, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Jan.
26, 1996, available in 1996 WL 4052945. "The first First Lady of influence was probably
Abigail Adams, wife of the second president John Adams. Her private letters detail her
strong views on women's rights .... "
7. See Wasserman, supra note 5, at 1217.
8. See Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. v. Hillary Rodham
Clinton, 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
9. Hillary Clinton has been a special envoy to China, India and Bangladesh.
10. 997 F.2d 898.
Section I
The Executive Branch immunity has its roots in common law. 1
Unlike members of Congress, whose protection from civil damage
suits is founded upon the United States Constitution (specifically the
Speech and Debate clause),' 2 executive branch immunity is a doctrine
created by the courts.' 3
Generally, there are two types of immunities: absolute immunity
and qualified immunity. 4 Absolute immunity is the strict "all or
nothing" approach, which was rigorously followed by the Supreme
Court until the 1970s.15 As Laurier Beaupre wrote in his article, "the
[Supreme] Court granted public officials either absolute immunity
from civil damages suits based on official actions or no immunity at
all."' 6 He further explained that "at its most expansive, absolute im-
munity shielded the discretionary official acts of judges, quasi-judges,
quasi-judicial officers and executive branch officials ranging from the
President and Cabinet Secretaries to mid-level bureaucrats.' ' 7
The first grant of absolute immunity was to none other than the
Judicial Branch itself. 8 In Bradley v. Fisher,'9 the Supreme Court
held judges absolutely immune from civil damage liability for judicial
acts falling within the judges' jurisdiction.2 ° The Court recognized
that disciplining an attorney, despite a malicious intent do so, fell
within the province of a judicial act.2 ' In doing so, the Court adopted
the English doctrine of judicial immunity based solely on public pol-
icy, without making reference to the common law maxim of absolute
immunity descending from the sovereign.22 The Court reasoned that
the judicial system could not function if judges did not have the free-
dom to follow their conscience without fear of litigation.'
11. See infra notes 15-59.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
13. See infra notes 15-59.
14. See id.
15. See Laurier W. Beaupre, Birth of a Third Immunity? President Bill Clinton Secures
Temporary Immunity From Trial, 36 B. C. L. REv. 725, 733 (1995).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351-52 (1872).
20. See id. at 351.
21. See id at 354.
22. See id. at 349-50.
23. See id. at 347-48.
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Similarly, in Spalding v. Vilas,24 the Supreme Court established
absolute immunity for high ranking executive officers. The Court held
the Postmaster General not subject to civil damages for actions taken
within the scope of his official authority.' As in Bradley, the Court
grounded its decision on public policy reasons.26 The Court explained
that "just as the judicial system could not function if judges feared
lawsuits, the executive branch could not function if officials could not
act in the public interest without fearing liability."'27
Perhaps the broadest extension of civil damage immunity was
recognized in Barr v. Mateo,28 in which the Court held that absolute
immunity extended to executive branch officials far below the cabinet
rank, so long as they acted within the scope of their authority. 29 The
Barr Court stated the long standing reasons for recognizing the execu-
tive privilege:
It has been thought important that officials of government
should be free to exercise their duties unembarrassed by the
fear of damage suits in respect of acts done in the course of
those duties-suits which would consume time and energies,
which would otherwise be devoted to governmental service and
the threat of which might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigor-
ous, and effective administration of policies of government. 0
The Barr Court extended the executive privilege to those far be-
low the department heads.31 It did note, however, that "the occasions
upon which the acts of the head of an executive department will be
protected by the privilege are doubtless far broader than in the case of
an officer with less sweeping functions."32 The reason, however,
rested upon the scope of the duties, not the title of the office."3
In the 1970s, the Court began to modify the absolute privilege
granted to executive officials. 34 Incrementally, the Court began to de-
velop a qualified immunity, which left intact the immunity granted for
24. 161 U.S. 483, 498-99 (1896).
25. See id.
26. See id. at 498.
27. Id.
28. 360 U.S. 564, 572 (1959).
29. See id. at 572.
30. Id. at 571.
31. See id. at 573.
32. Id. at 573-74.
33. See id.
34. Temporarily, the President received only qualified immunity if he lacked reason-
able grounds to believe his actions were within the law. See Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d
1192, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1979). However, the United States Supreme Court in Nixon v. Fitz-
gerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), reestablished the absolute immunity doctrine in the case of
civil damages. See id. at 749.
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acts within the scope of officials' duties but did not protect actions
taken by federal and state officials that clearly violated rights guaran-
teed by the United States Constitution or federal statutes."
The Court's first indication of modifying the absolute immunity
doctrine was in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics36 (Bivens 1). In Bivens I, plaintiff accused federal
agents of violating the Fourth Amendment by arresting him without
probable cause or a warrant.3 7 Although the Court did not rule on
whether absolute immunity served as a defense, it did hold that the
plaintiff had a cause of action and could recover money damages for
injuries suffered.38 The Court further remanded the case to the lower
court to decide the question of whether the agents' actions were pro-
tected by absolute immunity.3 9
On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit did not modify existing immunity doctrine, but declined to ex-
tend immunity to the agents based on the facts of the case.4" The
Court recognized that settled law protected "certain officers of the
federal government" from lawsuits while acting in their official capaci-
ties, even when charged with malice; but the Court also noted that this
immunity only extended to discretionary functions.4 The Court sim-
ply concluded that making an arrest was a ministerial and not a discre-
tionary act; therefore, the federal agents were not entitled to absolute
immunity protection.42
The development of the qualified immunity doctrine first arose in
the context of state officials in Scheuer v. Rhodes.43 Representatives
of the victims of the Kent State shooting charged Ohio Governor
James Rhodes, Adjutant General of the Ohio National Guard, and
various other Guard officers with violating their civil rights pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. section 1 983 .4 In dismissing their complaint, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that these
35. See Barr, 360 U.S. at 572.
36. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
37. See id. at 389.
38. See id. at 397.
39. See id.
40. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456
F.2d 1339, 1342-47 (1972).
41. Id. at 1342.
42. See id. at 1345-46.
43. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
44. See id. at 234.
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state officials were clothed with absolute immunity for the alleged
acts.45 The Court of Appeals affirmed.46
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower court's ruling
by relying on case law that held government officials answerable for
section 1983 violations.47 It established that only a "qualified immu-
nity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the
variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsi-
bilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably ap-
peared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be
based."48 In Scheuer v. Rhodes, the Court remanded to determine
whether the Governor's order of the shooting was within the discre-
tion of his authority.49
The Court, relying on the reasoning in Scheuer, extended the
qualified immunity doctrine to federal officials in Butz v. Econo-
mou.50 The Court dismissed the claim that the Secretary of Agricul-
ture and other high executive officials were immune from civil liability
arising out of an alleged constitutional violation.5' Instead, the Court
reasoned that once officials violated the Constitution, they exceeded
the scope of their authority and no longer qualified for absolute im-
munity protection.5" Therefore, it granted federal officials only quali-
fied immunity from damages arising from suits based on constitutional
grounds.53 However, the Court did leave intact absolute immunity
protection for federal officials performing special functions, specifi-
cally those that perform adjudicative functions.54
The Court's final retraction of the doctrine was in Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald," where the Court held that the President's private aides were
not protected by the absolute immunity doctrine. The Court reasoned
that "it would be equally untenable to hold absolute immunity an inci-
dent of the office of every Presidential subordinate based in the White
House."56 It did note, however, that for "aides entrusted with discre-
tionary authority in such sensitive areas as national security or foreign
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 238.
48. Id. at 247.
49. Id. at 250.
50. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
51. See id. at 485.
52. See id. at 495.
53. See id. at 507.
54. See id. at 508-17.
55. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
56. Id. at 809.
policy, absolute immunity might well be justified to protect the unhes-
itating performance of functions vital to the national interest.' 5 7 The
Court essentially reaffirmed Butz, which had established "that an ex-
ecutive official's claim to absolute immunity must be justified by refer-
ence to the public interest in the special functions of the his office, not
mere fact of high station.""8
It is clear from its development that the qualified immunity doc-
trine is grounded in public policy. The Supreme Court has established
immunity from civil liability to assure federal officials that they can
exercise discretion in performing their duties. The grant of immunity
enables officials to follow their conscience and act for the public inter-
est without fear of liability. Further, as the Barr Court stated, the
basis for the immunity doctrine is not the title of the office, but rather
the scope of the official's duties.5 9
Section H
To understand the need for a First Lady privilege, it is important
to examine the role assumed by First Ladies throughout history. The
lives of these First Ladies are well-documented. Indeed, historians
have noted that "the absence of any clearly defined role for presiden-
tial wives, the possibility that they exercised some private influence on
their husbands, and their place as symbols of how women ought to
behave, made them the object of the same kind of media attention
that surrounded actresses, sports figures, and society women."60
The First Lady's duty has always been to act as hostess or orga-
nizer of White House social events. 6' Nonetheless, rarely has a First
Lady adhered solely to this traditional role. As early as our second
"First Lady," Abigail Adams, one can observe presidential wives act-
ing as the President's and the government's representatives, and pro-
viding advice about important political decisions.62
57. Id. at 812.
58. Id.
59. See Barr, 360 U.S. at 572.
60. DILLER AND ROBERTSON, THsE PREsmENTs, FIRST LADIES, AND VICE PRESI-
DENTS, WHrrr House BIOGRAPHIES 1789-1989, 9 (1989) (quoting Betty Boyd Caroli).
61. See Wasserman, supra note 5, at 1226 n.37 ("Custom demands that the president's
wife organize and preside at social events. The first lady is supposed to arrange any teas,
receptions, banquets, coffees, and state dinners that the president may have. And although
she has both a personal and the White House domestic staff to assist her, the basic respon-
sibility is still hers, even on those occasions when she does not have to act as a hostess.")
(quoting DILLER, supra note 60).
62. See generally CARL ANTHONY, FIRST LADIES: THE SAGA OF THE PRESIDENTS'
WIVES AND THEIR POWER 1789-1961, at 60-72 (1990) [hereinafter ANTHONY I] (outlining
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Probably the most famous example of a First Lady who became
the President's sole advisor was Edith Wilson. After a stroke disabled
President Woodrow Wilson, Mrs. Wilson "made an immediate deci-
sion to become a sole conduit to the president."'63 Recounting her
unprecedented role, First Lady Wilson explained that the President
could not resign as a result of the stroke so she became her husband's
personal representative and made important governmental decisions:
Dr. D. leaned toward me & said, "Madame it is a grave situation
but I think you can save it[.] Have everything come to you-
weigh the importance of them & see if it is possible by consulta-
tions with the respective Heads of each Dept. to solve them
without the guidance of your husband. If not they of course
must go to him .... Then-I said-["]Had he better not to
resign-let the V.P. act.. .?" The answer again was-"No-Not
if you feel equal to what I suggest-for to resign would have a bad
affect on the country & as serious affect on the Pres. He has
staked his life & his promise to the World to do all in his power
to ratify the Treaty to make the League of Nations complete[.]
If he resigns-all incentive to recover is gone .... He has utmost
confidence in you & Dr. Grayson tells me he has always dis-
cussed public affairs with you-so you will not come to them
uninformed."
-So-I began my stewardship-I studied every paper & sent
for the different Secretaries or Senators-.. . the only decision
that was mine was what was important & what [was] not.6 4
From the time of President Wilson's incapacitation, Mrs. Wilson
controlled the flow of information to the President, and determined
which decisions he was going to make.65 Indeed, her apparent control
over the government was so great that famed League of Nations op-
ponent Republican Senator Albert Fall pounded his fist at a meeting
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and shouted, "We have
petticoat Government! Mrs. Wilson is President!
66
Abigail Adam's political influence during the time of her husband's presidency). Indeed,
"[t]he most startling recognition of the President's Lady was on her initiative when she
served as the president's representative at an official government event. Heading north,
Abigail stopped at a New Jersey federal army site, toured the camp thoroughly, and even
reviewed the troops like the president. 'I acted,' she boldly wrote him, 'as your proxy."' Id.
at 62. Even in the political arena, The President's foes dubbed Abigail Adams as "Mrs.
President, not of the United States, but of a faction. One senator noted that 'the President
would not dare to make a nomination without her approbation." Id. at 63.
63. Id. at 371.
64. Id. at 372.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 375.
As the presidents in the White House changed, the responsibili-
ties taken by successive First Ladies increased. The First Ladies did
not just wield power over their husbands, rather they took to defining
their own role and power. Many historians note that during the twen-
tieth century the First Lady's position became "The Office of the First
Lady."67 Undoubtedly, the first "First Lady" to form and shape this
"office" was Eleanor Roosevelt. Indeed, commentators have noted
that "Eleanor hadn't consciously invented a 'modem' first ladyship; it
had been evolving. What she did was mobilize traditional components
of a volunteer role into a 'job.' ",68
The era of the New Deal, and the threat of World War II, found
the First Lady employed in a government position for the first time.69
Eleanor Roosevelt became the unsalaried deputy director of the Of-
fice of Civilian Defense ("OCD").7 ° Selected by New York Mayor
Fiorello LaGuardia, whom President Roosevelt had appointed as di-
rector, First Lady Roosevelt alluded in a press conference that her
appointment was similar to any appointment by the President.71
When a reporter asked Mrs. Roosevelt how she decided to take a pub-
lic job. The following dialogue ensued:
Mrs. Roosevelt: "Well, the mayor had asked the President and
seemed to feel that the time had come when everybody who
could do any work as a volunteer should do it. Therefore, I de-
cided that as I could do it as a volunteer, I had better do it. The
mayor asked the President and me, both. The President has to
approve anyone who is going to be in a position."
Question: "He asked the President not for permission to ask you
but for permission?"
Mrs. Roosevelt: "Just as he would ask about anyone he was
bringing in as assistant director. Whether I would be useful, I
suppose. He may have asked him also from the point of view of
having any personal objections. I don't know about that."72
67. See generally CARL SFERRAZA ANTHONY, Fmsr LADIES VOLUME II: Ti SAGA
OF THE PRismENrs' WivEs AND THEm POWER, 1961-1990, at 283-294 (1991) [hereinafter
ANTHONY II] (titling the chapter The Office of the First Lady); BErrY BOYD CAROLI,
FIRSr LADIES, at 117-52 (1987) (noting the office of the First Lady as a twentieth century
development).
68. ANToNY I, supra note 62, at 455.
69. See id. at 490.
70. See id.
71. See Wasserman, supra note 5, at 1242 (citing Tim WrrE HOUSE PRESS CONFER-
ENCES OF ELEANOR ROOSEVELT 224 (Maurine Beasley ed., Garland 1983) [hereinafter
PRESS CONFERENCES]; ELEANOR ROOSEVELT'S My DAY: HER ACCLAIMED COLUMNS,
1936-1945, at 241 (Rochelle Chadakoff, ed., Pharos Books 1989).
72. Wasserman, supra note 5, at 1242 (citing PRESS CONFERENCES, supra note 71).
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First Lady Roosevelt's duties involved organizing a "national vol-
unteer network of women who persisted in emphasizing welfare, edu-
cational, and health issues."73 She had the authority to hire people on
her own.74 Despite her position, it did not take long for the pressure
of politics to force her resignation." She resigned on February 21,
1942, fifteen days after Congress voted to ban funding for a dance
educator Mrs. Roosevelt hired; an appointment for which First Lady
Roosevelt had been widely criticized.7 6
Eleanor Roosevelt was certainly not the last First Lady to be criti-
cized for taking an active role in government. Rosalynn Carter gener-
ated much controversy by her attendance at Cabinet meetings.77 She
writes in her autobiography that "[she] was there to be informed so
that when [she] traveled around the country, which [she] did a great
deal, and was questioned by the press and other individuals about all
areas of government, [she'd] know what was going on."'78
First Lady Carter continued Eleanor Roosevelt's tradition by
heading the President's Commission on Mental Health.7 9 Mrs. Carter
had to settle for being "honorary" chairperson, instead of the formal
chairperson, because of the federal anti-nepotism act.80 Despite her
title, Mrs. Carter's role was far from trivial. With an operating budget
of only $100,000 and a time limit of one year, First Lady Carter held
public hearings across the country, and managed 450 volunteers on
thirty task panels who developed comprehensive statements in special
areas of concern such as research, prevention, and the needs of special
populations.8 The Commission prepared a final set of 117
recommendations.82
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. See id- at 1241 ("As Mrs. Roosevelt writes, however, 'I soon discovered that the
very thing I had feared was true: that I could not take a government position, even without
salary or paid expenses, without giving ample opportunity for fault finding to some mem-
bers of the opposition in Congress and even to some of our own party people who dis-
agreed with certain politics." (quoting ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, Tins I REMEMBER 231-32
(1949)).
76. See id. at 1242.
77. See generally RosALNN CARTER, FIRST LADY FROM PLAINS 175 (1984).
78. Id. at 176.
79. See id. at 272. President Carter signed the Executive Order creating the Presi-
dent's Commission on Mental Health.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 273.
82. See id. at 274.
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The Commission's report and the First Lady's role did not end at
the desk of the President.83 In May, 1979, President Carter submitted
the Mental Health Systems Act to Congress. 4 Despite little prece-
dent, Congress called First Lady Carter to Capitol Hill to testify
before the Senate committee.85 Only one other First Lady, Eleanor
Roosevelt, had testified before Congress prior to Rosalynn Carter.86
Finally, in September, 1980, Congress passed the Mental Health Sys-
tems Act, the first major reform of federally funded public health pro-
grams since the Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1963.87
Not only did First Lady Carter assist in implementing a Congres-
sionally created program, but she became one of President Carter's
most senior advisers.8 In accounts of First Lady Carter's role, histori-
ans explain "the day before Carter delivered his 1978 State of the
Union Address, [the First Lady] went over the draft, suggesting
changes and additions, some of which he incorporated."89 Her influ-
ence did not go unnoticed:
[Rosalynn Carter's] son Jack said [she] was "almost like another
Cabinet member," and senior adviser to the president Hedley
Donovan characterized the First Lady's power as that of a "true
senior adviser," and "intimate political counselor" equating it
with the vice president's as an "ultimate example of the 'organic
adviser..."' Like all other advisers, she brought to him those
of which she believed he should be made aware, armed with an-
swers or evidence of personal accounts, statistics, projected re-
suits, and views of experts she might have consulted in the
process. 90
83. See CARTER, supra note 77, at 278.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id. Not only did First Lady Carter speak before Congress but traveled
throughout the world advocating mental health reform, including the World Federation for
Mental Health in Vancouver, British Columbia, the World Health Organization in Geneva,
Switzerland, and in Manitoba, Canada.
87. See id. at 279. Despite her success, Mrs. Carter confesses that:
Our celebration was brief. Within a month Ronald Reagan was elected President,
and with the change of administration, many of our dreams and the bulk of the
funding for our program were gone. I felt betrayed. After four years of hard
work and efforts by thousands of people, carefully studying an existing system of
care and making changes so it would be responsive and cost-efficient, community-
controlled, and accessible to those who desperately needed it, and after having
had the benefit of eighteen months of public scrutiny and careful adjustment-after
all this, the funding for our legislation was killed by the philosophy of a new
President. It was a bitter loss.
88. See ANTHoNY II, supra note 67, at 295.
89. Id. at 294.
90. CARTER, supra note 77, at 295.
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Undoubtedly, Rosalynn Carter performed roles far beyond the
traditional duties of hosting state dinners. "She consciously studied
the minutiae of details on even complex issues, immersing herself in
the thick of policy." 91 Moreover, "[w]hen the president had questions
relating to health and welfare, he consulted Rosalynn first ... she
easily delivered speeches on strategic arms limitations and civil
rights. 92 Besides playing a First Lady, Rosalynn Carter acted as a
Cabinet member and a senior adviser.
After examining the expansive roles played by former First La-
dies, Hillary Clinton's involvement in U.S. politics should not surprise
anyone. She is not the first politically active First Lady, nor the first to
face criticism for having undertaken such a role.93 Hillary Clinton has
continued in the tradition of former First Ladies by engaging in diplo-
matic relations and helping set the domestic agenda.94
Indeed, the public perception of the Clinton Administration
when President Clinton took office reflected what many advisers and
commentators had already a "Team Presidency."9 " It was not a secret
that Hillary Clinton played a role in evaluating the President's Cabi-
net nominees. Before Judge Kimba Wood withdrew from considera-
tion for Attorney General,96 it was almost certain that she would have
received the nomination.97 One of the most important reasons for
Judge Wood's consideration was Hillary Clinton's backing of her nom-
ination.98 Hillary was seen as "the person whose political network
and personal views had helped her [Judge Wood] get in the door."9 9
Furthermore, "[-illary] is one of only five people in the room (along
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Wasserman, supra note 5, at 1229. Hillary is also not the first First Lady to be
accused of financial impropriety. (Attorney General Janet Reno appointed an independ-
ent counsel in the wake of the Whitewater scandal to investigate if any individuals violated
either federal criminal or civil laws relating to their relationship with both President and
Hillary Clinton). "Julia Grant, wife of Ulysses S. Grant, had prominent associations with
the 'robber barons' of the day, most significantly Jay Gould and Jim Fisk. When the scan-
dal was uncovered that Fisk and Gould had tried to corner the gold market with the help of
important Government officials, the two directly implicated Mrs. Grant and accused her of
making enormous profit from activities. Her role in the crisis was never fully determined."
ANTHONY I, supra note 62, at 211.
94. See infra notes 95 and 96.
95. Howard Fimeman & Mark Miller, Hillary's Role, NEwswEEK, Feb. 15, 1993, at 18.
President Clinton's campaign slogan was "Buy one get one free."
96. See id. Judge Kimba Wood withdrew from consideration "when it became known
that, in 1986, she had hired an illegal alien from Trinidad to care for her child."
97. See id. "Wood was very likely to get the job."
98. See id.
99. Id.
with Vice President Gore, transition chief Warren Christopher and
two closemouthed aides) when Clinton goes over names for top jobs
Hillary's stellar resume makes her advice more than pillow talk."'100
Indeed, one administration official noted, "Of course she's in the loop;
she is the loop."'' l
In addition to advising the President, Hillary continued Rosalynn
Carter's tradition of attending Cabinet meetings0 2 and "traveling the
globe as an envoy. °103 This time, however, the First Lady had the full
backing of the President. 4 President Clinton openly voiced his opin-
ion on Hillary's attendance of Cabinet meetings by claiming, "[s]he
knows more about this stuff than most of us do. ' 1°5
Hillary's diplomatic missions to East Asia include the countries of
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. 6 Her most famous mission was in
September, 1995, when she attended the United Nations Conference
on Women in China.' 7 In preparation of the visit, officials claimed
that this would be a "'trial run' for a trip by President Clinton."'0°
They further noted that "the discussions over a China visit by...
Hillary Clinton were part of a continued effort by the White House
and China's leaders to improve bilateral ties."109
Commentators recognized that Hillary Clinton's speech at the
conference was highly important, not just for the conference itself but
for Chinese-U.S. relations. 110 A reporter explained that "[h]er di-
lemma was this: Failure to mention China's human-rights record
would leave her vulnerable to domestic critics, while bashing China in
China could damage Beijing-Washington relations at a sensitive mo-
100. Eleanor Clift & Mark Miller, Hillary Behind the Scenes, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 28, 1992,
at 23.
101. Matthew Cooper, Co-President Clinton?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 8,
1993, at 32.
102. See Clift & Miller, supra note 100, at 25.
103. Christian Chaise, Hillary Clinton Regains Political Limelight With Trip to China,
AGENCE FRANCE PRE.SSE, Sept. 1, 1995, available in LEXIS.
104. See id.
105. Id.
106. See Chaise, supra note 103.
107. See Hillary Clinton Attacks China on Civil Rights, KYODO NEWS INTERNATIONAL,
Sept. 11, 1995, available in LEXIS. The UN conference on women was touted as the larg-
est ever UN gathering, as well as the largest gathering of women.
108. Gore, Hillary Clinton May Visit China in New Year, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Dec. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS.
109. Id.
110. See E. Thomas McClanahan, As Much As I Hate to Admit It, Hillary Did Okay,
KANSAS Crrv STAR, Sept. 12, 1995, at C7 (the author opined, "The Speech was a
Winner.").
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ment."' Although she did not mention China by name in her
speech, Hillary cataloged the ills facing women and alluded to China's
lack of human rights policy toward women.1 12 Chinese officials re-
sponded with an icy reception.11 3
After examining the responsibilities undertaken by the First La-
dies, and understanding the nature and importance of those roles to
the U.S. Government, it is clear why the First Lady should be afforded
executive immunity. It is unequivocal that the First Lady is an impor-
tant player in Washington. The legal question, however, is how to
carve out such protection.
Section HI
Unlike the President and his appointees, the First Lady tradition-
ally maintains no constitutional power. She is accountable to no one.
Critics complain that even when she assists the President she cannot
be fired." 4 This lack of accountability has troubled critics of the
American Physicians court," 5 which held the First Lady was a de facto
federal employee or official.1 1
6
In American Physicians, the court addressed the issue of whether
the Federal Advisory Communications Act" 7 (hereinafter FACA) ap-
plied to the Health Care task force chaired by Hillary Clinton." 8 The
task force would be exempt from the provisions of the FACA only if it
was "wholly composed of full-time officers or employees of the fed-
eral government.""' 9 The Government argued that for purposes of
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See Fineman & Miller, supra note 95, at 22. When asked about the problem of
Hillary being appointed to the task force, Democratic polltaker Geoffrey Garin said, "If
it's just some politician heading a task force, you get rid of him and repudiate his report.
But if you don't like your wife's work, it's kind of hard to distance yourself from it."
115. 997 F.2d 898.
116. See id. at 905.
117. Passed in 1972, the FACA was enacted to control the growth and operations of the
"numerous committees, boards, commissions, councils, and similar groups which have been
established to advise officers and agencies in the executive branch of the Federal Govern-
ment." 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 2(a). "As Congress put it, FACA's purpose was: to eliminate
unnecessary advisory committees; to limit the formation of new committees to the mini-
mum number necessary; to keep the function of the committees advisory in nature; to hold
the committees to uniform standards and procedures; and to keep Congress and the public
informed of their activities." 997 F.2d at 903.
118. Hillary was appointed to the Chair of the Task Force to compile information and
suggestions in revamping the Health Care system. See id. at 900-01.
119. Id. at 903.
the FACA, "Mrs. Clinton is the functional equivalent of a government
officer or employee."12
In a case of first impression, the American Physicians court had
to determine what the First Lady's legal title meant. Finding no defi-
nition of employee or officer within the FACA, the court turned to
Title I of the United States Code,' 2 ' which provided that a federal
officer "includes any person authorized by law to perform the duties
of the office."' 22 The Court construed this language to govern a situa-
tion where "Congress authorizes someone who is not formally an of-
ficer (such as the President's spouse) to perform federal duties. Even
if... Mrs. Clinton does not occupy an 'office' specifically created by
Congress, she could still be regarded as an 'employee.'"z Despite
this rationalization, the district court held that Mrs. Clinton did not
meet the statutory definition of a federal officer or employee. 2 4
The appellate court took a different approach to defining Hillary
Clinton's title. The district court had relied on Title V of the United
States Code to hold that Mrs. Clinton did not meet the definition of a
federal officer or employee."z The appellate court, however, relied
on legislative history to point out that Congress "did not adopt explic-
itly all of Title [V]'s definitions in FACA.' 26 Instead, "Congress actu-
ally deleted from the Senate version of FACA definitions of 'officer'
and 'employee' that paralleled those of sections 2104 and 2105."17
The appellate court then turned to the Government's two argu-
ments. It did not find persuasive the argument that the "traditional, if
informal status and 'duties' of the President's wife as 'First Lady' gives
her de facto officer or employee status."'" Instead, the court found
120. Id. at 902.
121. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1998).
122. Id.
123. American Physicians, 997 F.2d at 904.
124. See id. at 902.
125. See id. at 903; see also 5 U.S.C §§ 2104 & 2105 (1998) (according to these sections,
an officer or employee must be: (i) appointed to the civil service; (ii) engaged in the per-
formance of a federal function; and (iii) subject to supervision by a higher elected or ap-
pointed official. Although Mrs. Clinton met the latter two requirements, undoubtedly she
failed to meet the first one because she was not appointed to civil service, which would
require a Senate confirmation.).
126. American Physicians, 997 F.2d at 904.
127. Id.
128. Id. The court was reluctant to be persuaded by this argument because it was not
"confident that this traditional perception of the President's wife, as a virtual extension of
her husband, is widely held today.... [I]t may not even be a fair portrayal of Mrs. Clinton,
who certainly is performing more openly than is typical of a First Lady." Id. Additionally,
the government did not decide which term to choose between officer or employee in claim-
ing status for the First Lady. "The government is uncomfortable at having to choose
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more persuasive the argument that "Congress itself has recognized
that the President's spouse acts as the functional equivalent of an as-
sistant to the President."'1 29 Indeed, the authorization to the President
to pay the White House aides includes the following provision:
Assistance and services authorized pursuant to this section to
the President are authorized to be provided to the spouse of the
President in connection with assistance provided by such spouse
to the President in the discharge of the President's duties and
responsibilities. If the President does not have a spouse, such
assistance and services may be provided for such purposes to a
member of the President's family whom the President
designates. 3 °
The government argued that, through this authorization provi-
sion, Congress understood that the First Lady assists the President in
his duties and thus serves as an "officer" of the Federal govern-
ment.' 31 Persuaded by this argument, the American Physicians court
read section 105(e) as creating a de facto official position for the Presi-
dential spouse.' 32
The American Physicians court's reasoning (that Hillary Clinton,
for the purposes of the FACA, became a de facto employee or official)
has been criticized. In his concurring opinion, Judge Buckley argued
that the efforts by the court to characterize the First Lady as an em-
ployee "lack an argument in support of the proposition.'1 33 Addition-
ally, Carl Wasserman, gave a well-developed account of section
105(e)'s legislative history that the statute does not create an office for
the First Lady.' 4 However, this analysis was limited to whether the
statute created an office of the First Lady, and noted that "Mrs. Clin-
ton's appointment as head of the Health Care Task Force may be a
federal appointment.' 35 Indeed, he indicated that "[o]ne could argue
that the First Lady is a private citizen in general, but that Mrs. Clinton
became a federal officer when the President appointed her to head the
task force."' 36
Although Wasserman admitted that Mrs. Clinton could become
an officer when appointed to a federal position, he pointed out that
whether Mrs. Clinton should be thought of as an officer or employee. The government's
discomfort is understandable." Id. at 905.
129. Id.
130. 3 U.S.C. § 105(e) (1998).
131. American Physicians, 997 F.2d at 904-05.
132. See id.
133. Id. at 920.
134. See Wasserman, supra note 5, at 1246 n.130.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1238.
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the American Physicians court wanted to avoid this reasoning. Was-
serman rested his conclusion on an opinion letter written by acting
Assistant Attorney General John Harmon. 137 Although the letter is
dated and does not address specifically the First Lady's position as an
adviser, it generally explained the employment status of informal
presidential advisers for conflict-of-interest purposes.13
After analyzing Title 5 of United States Code sections 2104 and
2105's provisions, Harmon defined an informal adviser as one who
"advises the President almost daily, principally on an informal ba-
sis.' 39 He did not think it essential that an appointment be identifi-
able for an individual to be considered an employee or officer if the
omission was necessary to avoid conflict of interest laws, or if there
was a firm mutual understanding that a relatively formal relationship
existed. 40 Hence, according to Harmon, "there must be official reten-
tion, designation, appointment or employment of the informal adviser
or there must be a basis to infer a formal relationship.''
Harmon concluded, however, that informal advice is not a federal
function and that an informal adviser was not an officer or em-
ployee. 42 He reasoned the official did not formally supervise the ad-
viser like a federal employee or officer since "the largely personal
relationship between the President and [the informal adviser]143 is
based on mutual respect rather than assignment of duties."'"
Harmon further noted that "[the informal adviser] discusses pol-
icy issues daily with the President, but we do not believe the mere fact
that [he] speaks with the President on a daily basis in itself alters the
fundamentally personal nature of the relationship that is apparently
involved here, just as Mrs. [Rosalynn] Carter would not be regarded
as a ... Government employee solely on the ground that she may
discuss governmental matters with the President on a daily basis! '' 4
Harmon's letter conflicted with the D.C. Circuit's holding.146
What damaged the American Physicians holding the most was Har-
137. See id. at n.101; See 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 20 (1977).
138. See Wasserman, supra note 5, at 1238 n.101.
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. In his letter, Harmon refers to the informal adviser as Mr. A.
144. Wasserman, supra note 5, at 1238 n.101.
145. Id.
146. See id.
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mon's description of a situation very similar to the First Lady's chair-
ing the task force and giving informal advice. 147
Mr. A [the informal adviser], however, seems to have departed
from his usual role of an informal advisor to the President in
connection with his recent work on a current social issue. Mr. A
has called and chaired a number of meetings that were attended
by employees of various agencies, in relation to his work, and he
has assumed considerable responsibility for coordinating the
Administration's activities in that particular area. Mr. A is quite
clearly engaging in a governmental function when he performs
these duties, and he presumably is working under the direction
or supervision of the President. For this reason, Mr. A should
be designated as a special Government employee for purposes
of this work-assuming that a good faith estimate can be made
that he will perform official duties relating to that work for no
more than 130 out of the next 365 consecutive days. If he is
expected to perform these services for more than 130 days, he
should be regarded as a regular employee. In either case, he
should be formally appointed and take an oath of office. This
formal designation would not necessarily affect the conclusion
that Mr. A's other consultations with the President are of a per-
sonal rather than official nature. Should Mr. A assume govern-
mental responsibilities in other areas, as he has done with his
work on the above project, he should be regarded as a Govern-
ment employee for these other purposes as well. 148
Wasserman argued that the Office of Legal Counsel's opinion
suggested that: "(a) the First Lady as First Lady is simply an informal
adviser and not an employee; [and] (b) if the First Lady is selected by
the President to take on unique responsibilities, she may become a
Federal employee, subject to the strictures placed upon such employ-
ees."'149 Some of the strictures Wasserman later discussed included
the anti-nepotism act, 5 ° the limit of outside employment,'15 revolving
door restrictions' and federal bribery laws.' 53 Wasserman concluded
that the American Physicians holding that the First Lady was a de
facto federal employee or official was a countervailing attempt to
avoid deciding the really tough question posed in the case: whether
the FACA encroached on the President's constitutional power. 4 He
claimed that "rather than take the hard road and rule directly on the
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See generally Wasserman, supra note 5, at 1239-44.
151. See generally 1250-54.
152. See generally 1254-56.
153. See generally 1256-59.
154. See id. at 1258.
FACA's constitutionality, the D.C. Circuit sought to avoid the is-
sue .... Instead, it chose to create a legal role for the First Lady that
does not exist."'155
Wasserman's reliance on the Office of Legal Counsel's letter was
misplaced. The letter discussed the consequences of an informal ad-
viser assuming governmental responsibilities. The difference between
the informal adviser and the First Lady was that no provision author-
izing a legal "office" for the informal adviser already existed. Section
105(e), as construed by the American Physicians court, created an as-
sistant position for the First Lady.' 5 6 Furthermore, the court left the
term 'assistance' undefined by stating "section 105(e) neither limits
the particular kind of "assistance" rendered to the President, nor cir-
cumscribes the types of presidential duties and responsibilities that are
to be aided.... It is reasonable, therefore, to construe section 105(e)
as treating the presidential spouse as a de facto officer or
employee.' ' 57
Most importantly, the court went further and admitted the conse-
quence of not holding the First Lady as a de facto federal employee by
stating "[o]therwise, if the president's spouse routinely attended, and
participated in, cabinet meetings, he or she would convert an all-gov-
ernment group, established or used by the President, into a FACA
advisory committee."' 58 The court implicitly acknowledged that that
First Lady participates and involves herself in situations that need to
remain confidential from the public.
Conclusion
The purpose of the immunity doctrine is to allow officials to fol-
low their conscience in fulfilling their discretionary duties. More im-
portantly, as the Court in Barr v. Mateo emphasized, the doctrine rests
not on the title of the office, but rather the scope of the duties.
By examining the roles that First Ladies have historically played,
it is evident that the First Lady's duties involve important matters,
such as attending Cabinet meetings, advising the President on Cabinet
nominees and helping plan the domestic agenda. All of these duties
necessarily require that the First Lady have the ability to exercise dis-
cretion in fulfilling her duties. Therefore, in situations where the First
Lady is acting in a capacity that requires her to exercise her discretion
she should receive qualified immunity from civil damage liability.
155. Id.
156. 997 F.2d at 904.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 905.
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